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This paper analyzes the patent examination and litigation process in terms of a simple Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium model, 
and interprets the results in line with real pro-patent trends in the US and other countries. Each country’s pro-patent 
policy option is different from the other because of reflecting its own path-dependent patent situation. That is, when a 
country adopts an easy patent policy (a pro-patent policy), firms in the country gain larger payoffs in the short term. 
Hence, every country seeks to adopt an easy patent policy. However, the easy patent policy undermines the true 
invention incentive. In this situation, it is difficult for any country to escape the problem, depending on the historical 
inertia. 
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Introduction 
Recently, many arguments have been put forward for an 
intellectual property system that seeks a following pro-
patent policy. Regarding the process of pursuing a patent, 
the Federal Trade Commission (2003) and the National 
Academy of Sciences (2004) are concerned about 
problems regarding the low level of patents without any 
link to innovation in the US. The Economic Report of the 
President of the Council of Economic Advisers pointed 
out the necessity for sufficient patent granting to 
generate broader patent protection than copyright or 
other intellectual properties. Regarding the process of 
implementing patents, excessive lawsuits are considered a 
problem given the extremely high legal costs, long court 
terms, the increasing number of patent lawsuits, 
extremely expensive damages or settlement packages, 
and patent tolls. For example, the extremely high legal 
costs (costs to both the plaintiff and defendant average 
US$4 million in patent lawsuits), long court terms 
(average invalid fixed terms are 12 years: 8.5 years for 
initiating the lawsuit and 3.5 years for disputing the 
patent), increasing number of patent lawsuits (1.5 times 
more than existed 10 years ago), and extremely 
expensive damages or settlement packages (US$909.5 
million: Polaroid vs. Kodak [1990]; US$612.5 million: 
NTP vs. RIM [2006]). 
This situation is described by Lemley and Shapiro (2005), 
who state that economists increasingly recognize that a 
patent does not confer upon its owner the right to 
exclude, but rather a right to try to exclude, by asserting 
the patent in court (see also Shapiro 2003).  
Lemley (2001) suggests that strengthening the 
examination process of the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) is not cost-effective, and that society would be 
better off spending its resources on a judicial inquiry into 
the validity of the few cases in which the examination 
process matters than paying for a more protracted 
examination of all patents ex ante. The key fact is that 
very few patents are actually litigated or licensed; most of 
them simply sit on a shelf unused, or are used only for 
noncontroversial purposes like financing. 
Chiou (2008) explains and extends this discussion by 
using Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) to argue that 
when the patent holder has private information about the 
patent’s validity, a weak patent is more likely to be 
settled and escape court challenges than a strong patent. 
When the economy is suffering from a low-patent-quality 
problem, a tighter examination by the patent office may 
strengthen private scrutiny over a weak patent.  
Farrell and Shapiro (2008) studied probabilistic patents, 
and concluded that weak patents licensed to downstream 
firms that are not rivals command correspondingly low 
royalties. On the other hand, weak patents on technology 
used by downstream firms that are rivals command large 
running royalties. Therefore, they suggest a targeted 
approach that involves the reexamination of issued 
patents covering valuable technology that is useful to 
multiple downstream firms competing against each other 
or against the patent holder.  
In this light, we consider a model based on Chiou’s idea 
of arranging the PTO’s function of quality control of 
patents and then discuss the perspectives of the long-
term and international context. 
The Model 
There are three players: An inventor A (she) seeks patent 
protection for her invention, which, if an application is 
filed, is examined by the patent office and possibly by a 
private challenger B (he) in court to verify whether the 
invention fulfills the patentability requirements specified 
in the patent law. 
Suppose that A’s patent has two types of patent invalidity: 
low invalidity type and high invalidity type. The low 
invalidity type patent has a low probability (x) of losing its 
patent litigation, while the high type has a high probability 
(hx: h > 1) of losing litigation. This is A’s private 
information, so A herself knows the type (good or bad), 
but B does not. B has a common initial belief, Pr(x) = y. 
Implicit in this assumption is that all the stages of the 
invention are complete, so that what happens at the 
patent examination stage has no impact on the 
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Figure 1. Model 
 
The timing is as follows. First, A creates an invention, and 
then she goes to the patent office to seek a patent. Next, 
the PTO grants a patent based on its patent policy. Then, 
B starts a litigation related to the patent validity. In the 
case of a patent challenge, A can negotiate with B before 
or after the litigation starts. We assume that, when 
bargaining, A makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to B. If 
there is no settlement, the court makes a judgment based 
on the probability (x or hx). 
When the patent is implemented, A will have 1 (payoff). If 
B wins the patent invalid lawsuit, then the payoff will be 
transferred from A to B after taking away the litigation 
costs (z). We do not consider the contingent fee. 
Based on his belief, B has an expected payoff of {yhx+(1-
y)x}(1-z): Bπ . Then, after B brings the lawsuit, A, with 
private information, has an expected payoff: (1-x)(1-z): 
L
Aπ , and (1-hx)(1-z): 
H




Aπ , which is 
due to x < hx. 
We consider the range of after-litigation costs in 
comparison with the previous expected payoff in this 
framework. The litigation process, which includes a 
patent validation lawsuit, always bears a heavy burden for 
the defendant. Therefore, before initiation of the lawsuit, 
if A takes into consideration both B’s expected payoff and 
her own litigation costs, then A makes a settlement under 
the following conditions: 
Firstly, if the litigation costs are too high to justify a 
litigation process, then A pays B a settlement charge (s); 
that is, something minimal, but more than B’s expected 
payoff: 
))1]()1(([1)1)(1( szxyyhxzx +−−+−<−− . 
The range of the litigation cost is unequal to (1) 









.   (1) 
Secondly, if litigation costs are not high enough for good 
A to take litigation action, and high enough for bad A to 
give up the litigation process, then good A takes litigation 
and bad A makes a settlement. Good A knows there is a 
high probability of winning and expects the good payoff 
after the litigation under reasonable litigation costs, while 
bad A has no choice but to make a settlement because 
she is also aware of her own payoff and her heavy 
litigation costs: 
)1)(1()1]()1([1)1)(1( zxzxyyhxzhx −−≤−−+−<−− . 






















A win: (1-z,0) 
B win: (0,1-z) 
A win: (1-z,0) 
B win: (0,1-z) 
 
(A’s payoff, B’s payoff) Settlement: (1-s,s)
Settlement: (1-s,s)
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Thirdly, if litigation costs are not high for either good or 
bad A, then A takes the litigation process, and states (1) 
through (3) occur: 
 )1)(1()1]()1([1 zhxzxyyhx −−≤−−+− . 








≤ .  (3) 
Therefore, if the value of z is in situation (1), then A 
makes a settlement with B before the litigation. If z is in 
situation (2), then good A takes litigation but bad A makes 
a settlement. If z is situation (3), then both good and bad 
A take litigation, and we subsequently have the following 
situations. In particular, we focus on the (3) situation. 
We use the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) to 
determine B’s action and A’s response.  
In turn, we consider the last phase of the litigation after 
all the court processes. 
If A knows that her payoff is more than B’s expected 
payoff, then A can pay B’s expected payoff plus a nominal 
amount to avoid a risky and costly decision. B accepts the 
offer because it is more than B’s expected payoff. This 













< .   (4) 
In this situation (4), we have a pooling equilibrium (A 
offers a settlement, then B accepts it). 
 (A, B) = (1-[yhx+(1-y)x](1-z), [yhx+(1-y)x](1-z)) 








 for the 
above payoff, and we obtain (A, B) as follows:  
 (A, B) = ( 1 1
, 1 1 1 )  (5)
 
In the payoff of (5), A’s payoff increases in h (
1 1 0, when x>z). 
If B’s expected payoff is between AH’s and AL’s expected 
payoffs, then AL hopes to pay B a compensated payoff in 
order to come to a settlement, but AH cannot. If A offers 
B compensation, then B accepts the payoff plus something 
minimal. This comes because of the following condition: (
H
Aπ < Bπ <
L
Aπ ) 















.  (6) 
In this situation (6), we have a separate equilibrium: AL 
offers a settlement, but AH does not. If B has the offer, 
then B accepts it (y = 0, due to PBE), B’s payoff is 
ε+−− )1)(1( zx . 
(A, B) = ( 1 h x 1 z h




In the payoff of (7), under 0 < x < 1, A’s payoff increases 
in h ( <0). 
If B’s expected payoff is larger than A’s expected payoff, 
then A cannot afford to avoid B’s lawsuit, as represented 
by the following condition: ( HAπ <
L
Aπ < Bπ ) 









.    (8) 
Under (8), we have another pooling equilibrium. (A does 
not offer a settlement.) 
(A, B) = ( 1 h x h
2x 1 z
1 h
, )  (9) 
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In the payoff of (9), A’s payoff ( ) decreases 
in h ( <0). 
Discussion 
Interpretation of the Model 
Based on this analysis, we can consider the situation of the 
inventor and the PTO among countries. We assume that 
once the PTO strengthens the patent examination, h will 
decrease because strict patent examination produces 
accurate and nonfluctuating patents.  
Given a specific value of x and y (fixed innovation ratio in 
the short term), if h decreases (increases), then A’s payoff 
will increase (decrease) in situations (5), (7), and (9).  
We can apply the above analysis (6) and (8) to Lemley’s 
discussion of the US problem. There are a number of weak 
patents, and strengthening the PTO’s examination leads to 
decreasing an inventor’s incentive (h goes down; A’s payoff 
goes up). 
The aggregate number of applications and grant of patents 
shows the policy change (see Table 1). We estimate the 
relationship between the number of US patent grants per 
year (USGR) and the number of US patent applications per 
year (USAPP) with around a 2005 patent policy change 
(USAPPDUMMY2005: USAPP multiply dummy variable; 
that is, 0 before 2004 and 1 after 2005) from pro-patent to 
marginally strict examination.2 The reduced formed 
estimation equation is as follows: 
USGR = a1+ a2 USAPP + a3 USAPPDUMMY2005 + 1ε  
The result of the estimation shows that the number of 
applications has significant positive impact on the number 
of grants (a2), and  significant negative impact on the 
USAPPDUMMY2005 (a3). Although the estimation is 
simple and does not eliminate bias, for example, serial 
correlation cannot identify but is doubtful, we can capture 
the change from the pro-patent policy trend. 
On the other hand, the analysis (4) can describe the 
Japanese patent situation. There is an atmosphere that the 
PTO’s examination is reliable. (See the ratio of patent 
                                                 
2 See US PTO The 21st Century Strategic Plan (2003). 
invalidation: First Japanese PTO, second US PTO; 95%, 
First US PTO, second Japanese PTO; 59%, Yasuda [2010], 
see also Takakura [2008].) In this situation, weakening the 
examination provokes an inventor’s incentive (h goes up; 
A’s payoff goes up). 
In a similar way, we estimate the relationship between the 
number of Japanese patent grants per year (JPGR) and the 
number of Japanese patent applications per year (JPAPP) 
with around a 1995 patent policy change 
(JPAPPDUMMY1995: JPAPP multiply dummy variable; that 
is, 0 before 1994 and 1 after 1995) from strict patent 
examination to pro-patent.3 The reduced formed 
estimation equation is as follows: 
JPGR = b1 + b2 JPAPP + b3 JPAPPDUMMY1995 + 2ε  
The result of the estimation shows that the number of 
applications has significant positive impact on the number 
of grants (b1), and also significant positive impact on the 
JPAPPDUMMY2005 (b2). Although the estimation is simple 
and does not eliminate bias, we can see the change to pro-
patent policy trend. 
When we consider the litigation cost (z) before and after, 
if h decreases (increases), then the range of z in (2) will be 
greater (smaller). This indicates that if the PTO 
strengthens the patent examination, then the litigation will 
decrease because necessary litigation costs are increasing. 
Thus, the PTO’s strict examination can lead to a crowding-
out effect of the patent litigation under the specific high 
litigation cost condition.  
This implies the relationship between the litigation 
mechanism and the examination policy of patents. It seems 
that the pro-patent policy discussion in several countries 
simultaneously and adversely in the 2000s has had an 
effect. In order to implement the pro-patent policy, there 
was great discussion how to strengthen the patent 
examination in the US. In contrast, relaxation of patent 
examination has provoked a great deal of discussion in 
Japan. 
Let us turn to the problem of research and development 
(R&D) of patents in terms of quality or quantity. 
 
                                                 
3 See Policy Committee on Innovation and Intellectual Property 
of Japan Patent Office (2008). 
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Dependent Variable: USGR   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1951 2008   
Included observations: 58   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 15971.32 2568.429 6.218320 0.0000 
USAPP 0.455311 0.016122 28.24124 0.0000 
USAPPDUMMY2005 -0.127054 0.015560 -8.165162 0.0000 
R-squared 0.951133 Mean dependent var 84676.71 
Adjusted R-squared 0.949356 S.D. dependent var 41031.29 
S.E. of regression 9233.767 Akaike info criterion 21.14946 
Sum squared resid 4.69E+09 Schwarz criterion 21.25603 
Log likelihood -610.3343 Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.19097 
F-statistic 535.2524 Durbin-Watson stat 1.075473 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 




Dependent Variable: JPGR   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1951 2008   
Included observations: 58   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 9457.035 4575.970 2.066673 0.0435 
JPAPP 0.172745 0.022969 7.520744 0.0000 
JPAPPDUMMY1995 0.149922 0.019288 7.772630 0.0000 
R-squared 0.883342    Mean dependent var 62308.34 
Adjusted R-squared 0.879099    S.D. dependent var 51165.07 
S.E. of regression 17790.48    Akaike info criterion 22.46105 
Sum squared resid 1.74E+10    Schwarz criterion 22.56763 
Log likelihood -648.3705    Hannan-Quinn criter. 22.50257 
F-statistic 208.2309    Durbin-Watson stat 1.432215 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Historical Pro-patent Policy and Its International 
Implications 
The mechanism of diffusion of the pro-patent policy does 
not consist only of the countermeasures of the 
governmental patent policy. We can understand the pro-
patent policy in terms of the international situation and 
innovation enhancement. 
We outlined the recent actual trend of patent policy in 
section 1 above. The US had adopted a pro-patent policy 
in the late 1980s, before the problems mentioned in 
section 1 came to the US. The policy made h increase and 
y decrease; then A’s payoff increased at that time. The 
policy made the US full of low-quality patents to obtain a 
larger payoff for an inventor in the short term. On the 
other hand, from the viewpoint of high-quality patents for 
true innovation, there was less innovation by bad 
invention; that is, high h undermines true invention, x. The 
US has faced this problem and sought to take measures to 
initiate or revive true inventions.  
As a countermeasure for this business climate in relation 
to patents, the EU and Japan wished to start to adopt a 
pro-patent policy following the US. In this regard, the EU 
and Japan considered the problem that faced the US, and 
they are challenging new policy-building strategies such as 
improving the process of perusing patents or a pro-
innovation policy based on the US experiences and their 
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This paper analyzed the patent examination and litigation 
process in terms of a simple model, and interpreted the 
results in line with real patent trends and the international 
context between the US and other economies. Each 
country’s pro-patent policy option is different from the 
other because of reflecting its own path-dependent patent 
situation.  
That is, when a country adopts an easy patent policy (a 
pro-patent policy), firms in the country gain larger payoffs 
in the short term. Hence, every country seeks to adopt an 
easy patent policy. However, the easy patent policy 
undermines the true invention incentive. In this situation, it 
is difficult for any country to escape the problem, 
depending on the historical inertia. 
A few economic contributions have started to devise a 
theoretical framework for the PTO’s overload problem 
(Caillaud and Duchene, 2010), and it would be interesting 
to investigate how this policy change that we have analyzed 
would be affected in a patent protection endogenous 
context. Another future analysis will involve widely 
empirical research using this simple model in terms of the 
different fields of patents and the comparative international 
situation. Based on this analytical and empirical study, we 
can contribute to a discussion of improvements of patent 
policy as well as its system design or litigation process. 
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